The Life of Sir General E.Y. Brabant

Accession 459: Cape Town Archives Repository, South Africa. p.129 following. The Unpublished Memoirs of an officer in the Colonial Army during the Anglo-Boer War fought between 1899 and 1902 in sub-Saharan Africa.

The history of the progress towards rebellion of the English and Outlander population in the Transvaal, they being driven to it by the intolerable corruption and oppression of President Kruger’s Government, it is useless to recapitulate; we all know what led to ‘Dr Jim’s’ dash across the border; perhaps few know of the actual causes which brought about what may be termed its happy failure.  I well remember the extraordinary excitement which was caused by the first news of the Raid.  For a few days previously it had been known that Dr Jim with a body of so called Police had been encamped upon the Border near Mafeking.  Then we heard of the crossing, and then for a day or two nothing was heard of the success or failure of the expedition.  I was on my farm at the time, which is about ten miles from East London; I had been for a long walk to visit a neighbour, had been caught in a heavy thunder storm and got wet through.  I had changed my things and was looking forward with interest to dinner, when a cart from East London drove up with Colonel Canning in it. As soon as he got into the house he informed me that I was wanted at once in east London, where a meeting was to be held that evening to consider the situation. News had arrived that Dr Jameson, had not succeeded in getting into Johannesburg, that it had lost heavily, and it was feared he would be compelled to surrender.  I got into town just in time for the meeting and found an amount of excitement prevailing, greater than I should have supposed possible among my usually quiet constituents.  Men were actually sobbing as they discussed Dr Jim’s danger; the wildest schemes were proposed.  It was said a thousand men were ready to start then and there to the Doctor’s assistance; how they were to be armed or how they (were) to be transported nobody stopped to consider.  I am afraid I risked my popularity very seriously that evening by urging moderation and patience. I succeeded in conjunction with others, in somewhat calming the popular feeling.  The next morning the news came the raiders had surrendered and that help of any kind was too late.  Then followed the trial and conviction of the Reformers in Johannesburg, and feeling became more and more embittered.  Early in 1897, very soon after the Raid, a man named Edwards, well known on the frontier, had returned from the Transkei, of which he was a Burgher; he was known to have taken part in the fight against Jameson, and he was indeed ill-advised enough to boast of it.  Not content with this, just as he was starting on his return for the Transvaal, he used at the railway station at Kei Road a very insulting expression about Dr Jameson, implying cowardice.  He was overheard by a young farmer, who promptly got together a party of young English farmers, amongst them being my second son, who had served under Dr Jameson in Matebeleland, and whose life had been saved by him when ill with fever. Furious at the insult offered to a chief loved by all who had served with him, they rode across to the Toise River Station and there tarred and feathered Edwards.  It was of course all wrong, but some allowance must be made for the provocation received.  A trial of those concerned was held at Cathcart, whither Edwards was escorted by fifty armed police.  The farmers of the district who were all English threatened to overpower the escort and lynch Edwards.  Wiser councils prevailed, however, but immediately after the trial a meeting was held at Kei River by a few of those interested, at which it was decided to form a political organisation to assert the rights of Englishmen in South Africa, and to counteract the designs of the Afrikander Bond.  This was the beginning of the South African league 1897. The new body grew apace; Dr Darely Hartly, a prominent politician on the frontier, became its first president; a meeting was held at Queenstown, and great progress was made in perfecting the machinery of the League.  The meeting place of the following year was fixed at Port Elizabeth.  The meeting of the Central Association had also been fixed at Port Elizabeth, one immediately following the other; I was asked by many of my farmer friends, who were members of the League as well as of the Association, to allow myself to be nominated at President of the League as well. I consented to this on condition that I should not be asked to retain the chairmanship of the Association.  This was agreed to and I was unanimously elected President of the League of South Africa.  Mr (now Colonel) Crew was appointed secretary and worked most zealously in forwarding the interest of the organisation, by starting new branches and extending its influence into new districts.  I made several tours round the country holding meetings to explain the aims of the League.  I also accompanied Mr Fuller, one of the men who had most to do with the formation of the League, in a electioneering tour in Temboland, for which constituency he was a candidate in our interest, and where he succeeded in obtaining a seat. We had now a small Parliamentary party of some seven or eight members, but it became evident that during this and the following year (1899) that although we had included most of the English farmers and the small store keepers and artisans of the town in the League we had not succeeded in securing the merchants and the monied classes, who always regard with suspicion any movement not started by themselves. The only person on whom we could rely by his influence to attract these classes was Mr Rhodes, whose views we knew were identical with ours. Mr Rhodes had already seen the necessity of party organisation to meet the Bond on equal terms, and about this time he secured the services of a gentleman who had acted as political organiser to the Conservative party in the North of Ireland, Mr Owen Lewis. Mr Rhodes was however, fully alive to the necessity of Union, and finding that we had our party in working order, he finally consented to allow himself to be nominated as President at the next Congress, which was to be held at Kimberley.  This happy result was not arrived at without long negotiation. I had one most characteristic interview with Mr Rhodes when we met in his bedroom; he took off his coat and waistcoat and strode up and down the room in his shirt sleeves, arguing with great vigour the point I had raised.  He wished to form a sort of General Committee of Leaguemen and some of his own followers, to watch the elections which were then pending; I objected to this unless every member of the Committee was a Leagueman; we argued the point until lunch.  After lunch as I was leaving he followed me down the steps at Groote Schuur and said ‘I don’t care Brabant I am going to pay my half crown and join the League’. I said laughing, ‘I shall only be too happy to take the half crown’. I eventually gained my point, Mr Rhodes as soon as he became a Leaguesman being as keen as any of us to increase its power and prestige. I had often before this time dined at Groote Schuur general getting a pencil note from him during the afternoon sitting at the house, asking me to come out and dine; I always knew that this meant a political discussion; he wished to ascertain from me the feeling of the farmers on some question before the House.  These were delightful evenings; for as there were usually only a few personal friends present, who were in sympathy with his views, he would after the discussion was over, launch out in describing the ideals he had before him as to the future of South Africa. Once of the most striking conversations I had with him was on the subject of the Cape-to-Cairo telegraph; he was showing me on a map of Africa the exact route he proposed to take.  It was long before Lord Kitchener made his way to Karthoum, and there seemed little prospect of the Mahdi being got out of the way.  Rhodes showed me the course of the Nile after leaving the great lakes was the route he proposed; I remarked to him that it would be easier in the then state of affairs in the Soudan, to strike to the Eastward from Uganda and follow the coast of the Red Sea from Berbera or Massowah.  He said, ‘No I have made up my mind to go down the Nile, and I shall carry out my determination’. He lived long enough, not indeed to carry out this great scheme to actual completion, but to know that practically all obstacles were removed, and that its completion was merely a matter of time, and no such long time either. My intercourse and intimacy with Mr Rhodes during the last  few years of his too short life convinced me not only that he was the greatest of living Englishmen, but that he was, if not the greatest, then one of the greatest Englishmen that had ever lived. For him the cynical saying true in many instances ‘ That no man is hero to his valet’ had no application; for his greatness of character was such that the nearer you were to him, and the more closely you could estimate his motives, the greater the man appeared to be. It is common now to bring a sort of general accusation against him and to say in vague terms that he made many mistakes; and great care is taken to avoid saying what the mistakes were.  I believe them to have been very few indeed.  The great mistake, the whole blame of which with a noble unselfishness, he took upon himself, may be quoted, but I have reason to doubt strongly his having intended that ill-timed and worse-conducted expedition to be carried out when it was carried out, I believe that he intended the show of force on the Border to be merely a demonstration, to bring the Boer Government to its senses. It is well known now that President Kruger was within an ace of giving to the Uitlanders the greater portion at least of their demands, when the premature invasion of the country spoiled everything.

The meeting of the League at Kimberley in 1899 was a most momentous and successful one; we all felt that we were on the eve of great events.  Everyone was inspired with a great determination to carry out the policy for which the League existed; the policy as tersely defined by out leader, of ‘Equality of Political Rights for all civilised men, from the Cape to the Zambesi’. At a dinner given by Kimberley to the Delegates some important speeches were made, the best perhaps being that of Mr Garratt, M.L.A. for Victoria East and Editor of the Cape Times, one of the most brilliant of those men who had been driven to South Africa by ill health, and who in many instances had proved most valuable citizens of the Country they had adopted, some as a temporary home.  

Unfortunately Mr Garratt has been compelled to leave us, but every South African Colonist will join with me in hoping that his health will permit an early return and a permanent settlement in the Country, whose best interests he supported in the Colonial House of Assembly, with such fervour and eloquence. It is curious to note how many of our leading politicians have come to the country as invalids.  Mr C.J. Rhodes, Sir Thomas Upington, certainly the best speakers we have had in my time; Sir Gordon Sprigg the present Premier, and many others whose names do not now occur to me.  At the conclusion of the Congress Mr Rhodes, was unanimously elected President for the ensuing year.  He had requested that I might remain in office as his second to undertake any of the detail work of the League for which he had not sufficient time.  I was therefore elected Senior Vice-President.

From this time it was evident to most of us that the only solution of the difficulties between the English-speaking and the Dutch-speaking parties in South Africa was to be found in war.  For a long period Mr Rhodes held the view that President Kruger would give way at the last moment, and would yield to the question of the franchise. I never held this view, because it seemed to me that the franchise question was only one of the reasons which prevented the two nationalities from living together and gradually becoming amalgamated into one people.  It seemed to me that President Kruger and the people who surrounded him were quite incapable of carrying on an enlightened and pure government, such as would satisfy the English Americans and other civilised people, whose numbers in Johannesburg were increasing year by year. If gold had not been discovered in such large quantities in the Transvaal, no doubt Paul Kruger would have been a most satisfactory President, as he understood his people, and was a determined, shrewd man, with a great deal of what used to be called ‘mother wit’. I must confess that President Kruger has always reminded me strongly of that famous Governor of the Island of Barataria, Sancho Panza. His intellect seemed admirably adapted to the solutions of those notty questions which were so satisfactorily settled by the astute Sancho. It seemed to me too that a settlement which would settle nothing was very much to be deprecated, and that war with all its horrors was preferable to a long course of agitation which would stop all course of progress and would only at last end with an appeal to arms.

While the sinister figure of Dr Leyds remained at President Kruger’s right hand it was absurd to expect that reforms would be granted which would have the effect of putting an end to the ambitious scheme of making South Africa a united Dutch Republic or as was afterwards said by one of those interested a ‘Greater Holland’. I was well aware too of the visions cherished by men like Mr Reitz, Messrs Steyn, Fischer, and other educated Africanders whose opinions I thought of far more weight than those of the intensely ignorant though shrewd President. At this time Mr Rhodes would frequently ask me what I thought of the prospects of war; I always replied that I did not think about it; I was perfectly certain that war was the only solution to the problem. Mr Rhodes used to rejoin laughing ‘Then after that this will be a country for a white man to live in’. I believe he was as convinced as I was of the imminence of war, but did not care to say so. The ensuing session of Parliament was marked, as might have been expected, by great bitterness of feeling between the two parties. The South African League now numbered twenty-six members of the Legislature and with Mr Rhodes at its head could no longer be safely ignored. The most violent member of the Government party was Mr Merriman, how, it will be recollected, had delivered a speech in 1885, pointing out the danger of the Bond policy, and accurately forecasting the results of that party if allowed to go on unchecked.

His predictions had been fulfilled to the letter, yet with the extraordinary inconsistency which has marked his whole political career, neutralising his brilliant abilities and making him useless to the country and a failure as regards his personal career, he now turned completely round and joined the very party, the existence of which he had previously denounced as a public danger.  For Mr Schreiner everyone must I think have felt pity in the position which he found himself placed; namely that of trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. He is a brother-in-law of Mr Reitz and those who know how he was bound up in his family life, and how strong an influence familyties had on many in those days, could appreciate his difficulties, and could make allowances for the occasional inconsistencies into which he was betrayed. I was personally aggrieved because he had stated before the Commission of Enquiry into the Jameson Raid at home that I had boasted that I would march through the Transvaal with two thousand Colonists.  I had never said it; what I had said was that I hoped if war should break out the English Government would obtain the services of at lest two thousand Colonial troops to show them the best way of meeting Boer tactics, and that I hoped, if wanted, that number at least would be forthcoming from the frontier districts. When I remonstrated and contradicted the statement he took up the extraordinary position that I was as wrong in alluding to the bare possibility of war, as if I had made the absurd boast that I was said to have made. The South African League, from the fact that so many of its members lived in Dutch districts and could scarcely avoid knowing what their Dutch neighbours were doing, had long been well aware that the Dutch in the greater part of the Colony were steadily arming themselves or being armed with modern rifles, and were collecting stores of ammunition. I was requested by the people of Kimberley to represent the facts to Mr Schreiner head of the Government and to urge him to take measures to arm the loyal population and so place them in a position to defend themselves in certain eventualities.  I wentto his office and made my request and was not surprised to meet with a somewhat curt refusal.  He almost passionately denied the possibility of war. I said I could not understand how he could do that in the face of the critical negotiations then going on.  He then said even admitting the possibilities of war between England and the Republics, there would be no invasion of the Colony. He repeated this so often and with such an air of conviction that I began to think he must be in possession of some assurance to that effect from the Republican authorities.  Finding him immovable, I left him, saying that I would at least be glad that the responsibility was his and not mine. In the course of the Session it came out that permits had been signed for passing large amounts of ammunition into the Colony, amongst other consignments one of a million and a half of Martini cartridges.  There can be very little doubt that this ammunition was afterwards used against British troops.  It seemed quite impossible to convince Mr Schreiner that there was any danger of war.  Nothing was more extraordinary by the light of after events that the persistency with which the Dutch members asserted their loyalty.  Two of these gentlemen were among the first to join the enemy when the Colony was invaded and are now (1902) living in Holland, presumably on the proceeds of the gold taken by President Kruger in his flight from the Transvaal; others are living as prisoners on parole in Cape Town or elsewhere. There are it is true, some who have remained loyal under every inducement to be otherwise, but these were the men who did not so loudly proclaim their loyalty.  I am not attempting to give any history of the events which immediately preceded the war but simply of those in which I was personally concerned.  It was at this time, the close of the Session, that I made a promise that I have done my best to fulfil; that I would take any work that might be assigned to me in the coming struggle, whether of a military or any other nature. At this time I was asked to meet some officers who had been appointed to raise a force to be known hereafter as the Protectorate Regiment, and to give them advice and assistance as to recruiting, etc. One of these officers, Captain Fitzclarence, who afterwards received the V.C. for his gallantry at the siege of Mafeking, was going to East London, so I gave him a letter to my friend Colonel Coming, O.C. Kaffrarian Rifles, asking him to give all the assistance he could in raising the right class of men.  The result was that a very fine squadron was raised which distinguished itself during the siege of Mafeking.

Chapter 11

In the course of the next month or two events of the greatest importance occurred, winding up with the famous Ultimatum, and the invasion of Natal. Early in October I was directed to raise a Colonial force of six hundred men.  It was intimated that an Imperial officer would be detailed to assist me, and very much to my surprise and pleasure I found that the officer appointed was Lieut. Col. Ewart, my second cousin. I had been sent for to Cape Town to receive instructions, but at once returned to East London where Colonel Ewart joined me, and we proceeded up the line, Colonel Ewart having been instructed to report upon the position in that part of the country.  We stopped at several points where I had an opportunity of appealing to my old friends, who had served under me in former wars, to help me again in forming the new force. I received many promises of assistance and then went on to Queenstown which I had fixed upon as my head-quarters.  From here we went up the line as far as Stormberg, which was held by some three or four companies of the Berkshire Regiment, with a small force of the Navla Brigade.  

The officers and men of the latter appeared thoroughly to enjoy their new duties. One of them explained to us that they had been trying to convert their naval landing guns into Horse Artillery.  They had got a team of mules harnessed to the guns and to make the thing complete they had put two unhappy Marines on the limbers. Presumably they started at full gallop, at all events the Marines were soon shaken from their seats.  This could not be allowed, so they actually lashed them on, after which all went well and the experiment was declared a great success. Ihere met for the first time Colonel Maxwell R.N. who was to be of the greatest assistance to me hereafter, and whose name will always be associated with the Colonial division.  On our return to Queenstown Col. Ewart inspected a position which I pointed out to him at the head of the steep incline on the railway between Cyphergat and Sterkstroom.  This was soon after occupied and proved of the greatest value, protecting the railway where protection was most necessary.  On my return to Queenstown I lost no time in beginning to recruit for my new corps Brabant’s Horse.  Unfortunately I lost the services of Col Ewart who was called away to fulfil more important duties elsewhere, being appointed Brigade Major of the Highland Brigade under General Wauchope.

I have always found that it is difficult to make the first start in raising an irregular corps.  You have to find officers who are at once popular and efficient tow qualities which do not always go together. I was however successful in obtaining the services of Captain Goddard who belonged to a well known frontier family and was also well known in Johannesburg.  He started the first squadron and as the Komga volunteers joined in a body they made another; from that time recruiting went on merrily. General Gatacre was now in Queenstown, commanding the first division.  Unfortunately only about half of the regiments which properly belonged to the division had turned up. Captain de Montmorency, V.C. of the 21st Lancers was the first officer appointed as adjutant and Staff Officer and soon after Lieut. Cookson of the first Life Guards was attached to the force.

It was a condition that under me the Commanding Officer, second in command and adjutant were to be Imperial officers.  We had great difficulties at first to contend with in the matter ofequipment.  The original idea was that the men should find their own horses and equipment, arms of course being provided for them. This system was soon discovered to be unworkable.  The men were to receive pay at the rate of five shillings per diem with an allowance of half a crown per diem for the use of the horse bought by the trooper; half a crown per diem in lieu of rations when not procurable by army Service corps; and a further half a crown for horse rations under similar circumstances.  It was a very expensive system in the first place, and in many ways was objectionable.  If horses were killed in action or died from causes beyond control of the owner, the value of the horse was to be refunded.  I have always looked upon the system of men finding their own horses under the above conditions a great mistake.  It may answer very well in India in the Irregular Cavalry, where the men are mostly small farmers who breed the horses they ride and naturally look after them well. But it leads to endless difficulties and troubles in South Africa.

Finding that the work of organising and equipping was very heavy, I asked for assistance, and Major Rivett-Carnac was sent to me.  He was of great assistance to me.  We were being hurried up as things were becoming critical on the frontier. Commandant Olivier had crossed the Orange River at Aliwal North and had been joined by a large number of Colonial Rebels.  It was now that the ill effects of the fatuous conduct of the Schreiner Government was seen. Owing to Mr Schreiner’s persistent disbelief in the intention of the Free States to invade the Colony, he had refused to allow the Cape Mounted riflemen to be moved up the Orange River.  Had a squadron of the C.M.R. been stationed at Aliwal North and another at Bethulie, I sincerely believe that no invasion would have been attempted.  But owing to the absence of any show of defence at these points, the disaffected Boers in the Colony were encouraged to rise, and to invite their friends across the Orange River to come to their assistance.  From information I obtained soon after this, I was convinced that Olivier and his Burghers crossed with great reluctance. The first body that crossed were about a hundred and fifty strong, composed entirely of old men and boys.  Such a force as fifty men of the C.M.R. could easily have defended the bridge against them.  Those who refused to recognise the gravity of the situation and declined to make any efforts to defend the Colonial boundary are responsible for the terrible loss of life, and destruction of property which resulted.

I have said that I was very much hurried in the organisation of the new force. Three squadron were sent forward as soon as they equipped – Captain Goddard’s, Captain Flanagan’s, and the third commanded by Captain Fieldens 7th Hussars, who had been attached to the corps.  These squadrons were stationed at different points between Sterkstroom and Penhoek on the way to Dordrecht, which was occupied by Colonel Dalgety with a portion of his regiment.  A most unfortunate mistake had been made in the evacuation of Stormberg Junction.  The only excuse I could ever hear of for this was that there was not a sufficient supply of water for the garrison. Apparently the garrison necessary to hold the position, which was a strong one, was over estimated, as there was enough water for the force which had previously held it, and which was quite strong enough to hold it against any force of the Boers.  The result was that the enemy occupied it at once, recognising the great advantage of the position. General Gatacre, having now got together what he considered a sufficient force, determined to drive the Boers from their position of which they had made use to destroy the railway bridges and culverts on four sections of the line, towards Bethulie and Aliwal on the north, Steynsburg on the west and Molteno on the sought.  I was in Queenstown at this time and knew generally that an attack was contemplated, but knew nothing of the details; I was horrified therefore when Colonel Rivett-Carnac showed me a wire just received from General Gatacre on the morning of the battle, saying that he had met with a serious reverse and was falling back on Queenstown.  Most fortunately he changed his original intention so far as to halt at Sterkstroom and retain the strong at Bushmans Hoek.  That evening a large number of wounded men were brought into Queenstown, the more serious cases being sent on to East London at once. Every arrangement possible was made to accommodate such of the wounded as were to remain at Queenstown.  The ladies provided refreshments and undertook to assist in nursing the men temporarily.  My daughter, who was staying in Queens town with a friend, was amongst those who assisted on this occasion, and she afterwards expressed to me her astonishment at the fortitude shown by the wounded men. They treated their wounds with indifference and complained more of fatigue than of anything else.

Very late that night some of the officers who had been in the action came in and we were able to get some idea of the causes which had led to the disaster. What there had been dwelt upon in the dispatches published since, with the exception of one of the most important, which I do not remember having seen mentioned in any official account of the battle.  What I allude to is the fact that the troops were beaten before they got into action at all. They were moved the day before the battle from their camp at about 2 p.m. having been busy most of the morning on fatigue work.

They were then kept for several hours in a hot sun in open trucks on their way to Molteno. Here they were halted for a time, presumably for rest, but again they were put on fatigue, loading ammunition, etc. and finally they were started on a fourteen mile march to Stormburg in a dark night. None who has not experienced it can know how trying a long night march is in an unknown country, as this was to most of those concerned. The rest of the story is well known, the road was missed and the whole force wandered about until daylight came.  What else could be expected? The men, especially the Irish Rifles, made a desperate effort and actually were on the point of success, when by a terrible mistake our own guns opened fire upon them. The physical exhaustion of the men was by this time so great that many of them fell asleep in the ranks. The officers were equally exhausted; in fact in some cases the strain on them had been greater than on the men. Tow of those who returned to Queenstown on the night of the battle had been thrown completely off their balance by the efforts of long continued fatigue and want of sleep. It has always seemed to me that general officers should make it one of their principal cares, if they desire success (and who does not) to see that their men are brought fresh into action – the officers with their faculties undimmed by fatigue and the men with a reserve of strength so that they can follow up a successful attack by hot pursuit.  General Gatacre, a gallant soldier, popular with his men and as fine a specimen of an English gentleman as I have ever met with, erred in the particular I have just mentioned, from the accident of himself possessing an extraordinary physique. He did not seem to know what fatigue meant. He would ride forty miles a day as a regular thing; always got up himself at dawn and expected everyone about him to do the same. As is so often the case with men blessed with exceptional strength and endurance, he did not make allowance for men of weaker constitution and less muscular strength.

Shortly after this unfortunate business I got orders to increase my corps to double the strength it originally sanctioned, and to divide it into regiments.  I had decided to call the corps Brabant’s Horse.  I was furnished with sufficient men by the town of Port Elizabeth to make up a squadron which was placed under the command of Captain Crallan an officer of the Natal Police; recruits came in fast. Major Henderson of the 8th Hussars was appointed to command the first regiment and Major Grenfell, of the 1st Life Guards to command the second. The first had a Captain Feldin (7th Hussars) as second in command and Lieut. Mussenden (8th Hussars) as Adjutant; and Major Grenfell had Lieut. Cookson (1st Life Guards) as second in command and Lieut. Williams (1st Bengal Lancers) as Adjutant.  When the raising of the Corps was first proposed the ideas was that I should not go into the field with it.  But the old friends who had served under me years before and who were now putting their sons and nephews into the field objected and said they would only allow their sons to go if I went in command. As there was no choice therefore – and much to my own delight I must confess – it was understood that I was to go with them when the time came. A detachment of our men had already had a brush with the enemy near Dordrecht, and had done very well against superior numbers.

I had decided at this time in consequence of the scarcity of grazing caused by the long drought, and for other reasons, to move my headquarters camp from Queenstown to some point lower down the line where there was plenty of grass and water. I selected Imvani station on the Black Kei and we at once moved down there.  Here we went on drilling our men and general getting them into shape. We were strengthened by the arrival of several ex-imperial officers who had come out to South Africa anxious to take part in the war.  Major Merritt, also, an officer of the Canadian Army, joined us here, and accepted the command of a squadron. Before we left Queenstown Captain LIttle, who had been serving on General Gatacre’s Staff as Colonial Staff Officer, came to me as A.D.C.  Unfortunately he only stayed a very short time, being called upon to resume his duties as managing director of a Rhodesian Mining Company. However towards the end of December he returned for a day or two and talked over the possibility of the formation of a Colonial division composed entirely of Mounted Colonial troops and immediately afterwards I received a wire from Mr George Farrar (who had given us the most general assistance in the formation of an ambulance cops in various other ways) asking me whether he could say that I would be willing to accept the command of such a division if offered.  I of course replied in the affirmative. Shortly after I got an order to proceed to Cape Town from the Commande-in-chief (Lord Roberts). I had to go to Queenstown and proceed from their by Cape Cart to Cradock to get on to the main line, as the enemy were in possession of Stormburg, which made it impossible to go by the ordinary route. I was fortunate in finding at Queenstown my old friend Colonel Schembrucker who was going the same way as myself, and whose excellent qualities as a travelling companion are well known throughout South Africa. We started the morning following my arrival at Queenstown, reached Tarkastad that night and Cradock the following afternoon in time to catch the train for Cape Town.  On my arrival in Cape Town I reported myself to Lord Kitchener the C.O.S. and was by him taken to Lord Roberts who, after stating to me what had been suggested, asked me what I would propose to do with a force of the kind indicated. I had naturally thought the subject out pretty thoroughly and I at once proceeded to lay before the Commander-in-Chief my ideas on the position. I proposed to retake Dordrecht which had some time previously been abandoned, Colonel Dalgety retiring with the C.M.R. to a point just within the native territories, and our three squadrons falling back to Penthoek and Sterkstroom.  After taking Dordrecht I proposed to move upon Burghersdorp so as to threaten the communications of the Boer Commando at Stormburg with Aliwal and Bethuli. I felt convinced that if I could so far succeed (and I knew that if I could get a sufficient body of troops it would be done) the Boers would at once evacuate their position at the Stormberg, which would indeed become untenable. After consulting maps, etc. Lord Roberts was good enough to approve of my plan and told me to go fully into the composition of the force with Lord Kitchener. I had stated in reply to a question that I estimated the fore necessary at 3000 mounted men and six guns (15 pounders). I was invited to dine with Lord Roberts that night and spent a very pleasant evening, and the next morning went to Lord Kitchener’s office.  He was busy at the moment, but asked me in the meanwhile to give any hints I could to the officers of the A.S.C. on the subject of transport. I then suggested – what I afterwards urged as strongly as possible in the case of my own division – that waggons and oxen should be purchased outright and placed in charge of a competent Colonial, men of experience instead of contracting for hire of transport. Lord Kitchener favoured this idea to the system I proposed and preferred contract. Had my suggestions been adopted at that time hundreds of thousands of pounds would have been saved.  No one at that time had any idea that the war would last beyond a few months.

Part IV

On going into the question of the force I was to command, I was disappointed in the first place by Lord Kitchener telling me he could only spare four 15 pounders. With regard to the men I was to have my own two regiments, the Cape Mounted Riflemen or such portion of that regiment as was then under Colonel Dalgety’s immediate command, the Kaffrarian Rifles, Queenstown Rifles, a regiment then being raised by Colonel Crew known as the Boerder Horse, and some other small corps. It was also understandable that I was to have detachments of nearly all the Colonial Volunteer Corps.  This however, was altered afterwards.  Lord Kitchener also proposed to send me a number of the Yeomanry then arriving from England. I still think it a great pity this was not done; they would have taken far less time to learn their way about, and would have been far more useful if Brigaded, for a time at least, with Colonial troops. I had suggested to Lord Kitchener the day I met him first that as I was to be in command of a number of Imperial officers, it would be better if I were given some definite local rank. He then told me to my equal surprise and gratification that I was to be at once gazetted to the local rank of Brigadier-General, this being the first time that such a rank had been conferred on a Colonial officer. I now prepared to return to Queenstown and on taking leave of the High Commissioner he made the somewhat caustic remark ‘that he hoped my promotion to the rank of General would not have the effect of depriving me of the brains I now possessed’. I returned by sea to East London as I had to pick up the guns there. Much to my annoyance I found that four of the guns originally promised had been cut down to two.  I had to make the best of it however, and we afterwards had an additional two guns given us. We had also a 13-pounder Hotchkiss gun presented to the 2nd Brabant’s Horse by Messrs. Weernher Beit & Co. The ammunition for this gun was very defective although it proved useful later on.  I hurried up to Imvani where I found everyone anxious to get into the field. We then moved into Queenstown where I was to collect as large a number of the division as possible.  I found a great deal of difficulty in getting my outlying detachments together as they had been found very useful in the neighbourhood of Queenstown.  We had a final parade for inspection, when the two regiments turned out in considerable force looking very fit and quite ready for the field. I had to make a contract with Messrs Wiel for hiring a hundred waggons as the authorities would not allow me to purchase.  The collecting of these waggons delayed us for some item, but the first week in February we contrived to get away and marched to Penthoek via Sterkstroom.  I had been joined by the Kaffrarian rifles, 500 strong andthe C.M.R. Artillery, the latter with four 7 pounders. The Queenstown Volunteer Rifles and the Boerder Horse were to follow, not being yet fully mounted and equipped. Colonel Dalgety with the main body of the C.M.R. was stationed at Bird’s River, the furthermost station occupied by us on the line from Sterkstroom to Indwe.  On reaching Penthoek we found the Royal Scots stationed there.  They had been attacked a few days before this, but had succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Before leaving Queenstown I had been very fortunate in securing the services of Major Maxwell R.E. who had been C.O. of the R.E. attached to the 3rd Division. He volunteered to join the Colonial Division, much to my delight, and his services proved, as will be seen invaluable.  Major Tamplin had been appointed my A.D.C. and Lieut. Elliott, the son of Sir Henry Elliott, Chief Magistrate of the Transkey, came to me as galloper.

The camp at Penthoek was situated very well in a grassy valley with a small lake of good water in the middle of it.  Here we made our final preparations and on the 13th February we marched for Dordrecht.  A few days previously an attack had been made upon Dalgety’s position at Bird’s River by a considerable force of the enemy who had a Krupp gun with them.  With this gun they had made good practice and the C.M.R. suffered some casualties. The railway beyond Bird River had been damaged a good deal by the Boers, and it was necessary for me to take sufficient supplies for the Column, to last until we could take Dordrecht and get the line in working order again. We had, as a matter of fact, far too long a convoy, but this was unavoidable, as supplies of food and ammunition were indispensable.  It was impossible to make a rapid march under such conditions, and I could not do more than about ten miles for the first day.  The following day we fully expected to meet with determined resistance and made our preparations accordingly.  Colonial Grenfell had charge of the Cavalry screen and advance guard, and did his work admirably. The enemy had, as we afterwards ascertained, meant to hold two or three favourable positions, but were so afraid of being outflanked by our long line of skirmishers that they hurriedly retreated, and allowed us to reach our camp, about five miles from Dordrecht, unmolested. I had been urged by Mr Clark, a leading English farmer in the neighbourhood, who acted as guide, and was both now and hereafter of immense use to me, to make an attempt to surround Dordrecht, or rather to attack it in front and rear simultaneously.  But after careful consideration I rejected this plan.  It would have been a somewhat complicated move, and it was essential that in our first encounter with the enemy no mistakes should be made. The men, at least the majority of them, had never been under fire before, and they had not as yet acquired the confidence in themselves and their leader, that ‘prestige’ in fact which ere long was to make them so certain of victory in every action they fought, as to be practically invincible. I therefore determined to feel my way very carefully, and trust to luck to get an opening which would give me a good chance of success. We moved forward soon after daylight. Dordrecht lies in a valley; behind the town there is a high mountain broken slightly by a small plateau which commands the valley, the other side of which is formed by a long low ridge rising very gradually from our camp but falling abruptly towards the low ground of the valley and thus forming a good line of defence. In addition to this a large donga, or rather the dry bed of a stream, cut through the low ridge at right angles about a mile to the left of the road on which we were advancing.  I sent forward three squadrons extended in skirmishing order as a screen and in front of this scouts, two of the smartest men from each squadron, were sent on a thousand yards in front of the screen with instructions to keep their horses at a sharp canter when close upon the ridge so as to be able to turn and gallop back if they came suddenly upon the enemy. Sure enough when the scouts appeared on the ridge they were at once fired upon and that from several points.  It was evident however that the enemy, unless much strong than I supposed them to be, could not hold the whole length of the ridge. Captain Lukin at once opened with shrapnel on the point where the fire had been heaviest while a couple of the squadrons galloped well to the right to get a footing on the ridge and turn the left of the enemy’s position. Then for some hours we fought our way along the ridge; at last we had to halt and hold on to what we had got, as it became clear that the donga, which I have said cut the ridge at right angles, was strongly held and from it a very heavy fire was kept up, which compelled our men to keep well under cover. About midday Captain Crallon whilst looking to his men putting up some shelter for themselves was shot dead and several other casualties occurred.  Major Maxwell with a few men of the C.M.R. crept down a small donga under a tremendous fire and succeeded in occupying a house in the valley below, but even from here there was no possibility of silencing the fire from the Boer position in the mouth of the dry water course, which was very well covered. I had sent Captain Bettelheim with his squadron across the water course lower down to try and force his way on its left bank, but he was on the open flat and could only get along very slowly, so I determined to wait for darkness and then to rush the Boer position with a bayonet.

Captain Flanagan undertook this, but when the dismounted men dashed into the donga, they found the Boers had cleared out leaving several waggon carts and a quantity of miscellaneous property behind. In the morning we found that although we had got the ridge we had yet to secure the town below. On sending Captain Goddard’s squadron to take possession they were fired upon from the small plateau above and compelled to evacuate it, and soon afterwards we discovered that the enemy had got a 9 pounder Krupp in position. They now shelled our ridge, which they could just reach at 6000 yards range; Lukin whose guns had only a range of 4200 yards tried to get at them by moving his guns into the valley, but with wonderful accuracy the enemy put a shell into the middle of one of his gun teams, killing two or three horses, and smashing a gunner’s leg. He had therefore to get his gun back under cover. An artillery duel lasted all day, and I began to think it would be necessary to send a force round the back of the mountains when the Boers saved further trouble by retiring. We took possession of the town and the plateau the following day; I sent up two guns and the Frontier Mounted Rifles to hold it, thus securing ourselves against any attempt to retake the town. Lieut. McDonald R.E. who had volunteered, was now attached to the division as Assistant Staff Officer, and he was busily engaged at once in preparing damages to the railway, as until we could obtain supplies by rail we could not only make no further progress, but our position was somewhat precarious. At this time Captain Ferguson of the 24th was my Chief Staff Officer, and had done excellent work during our two day’s fighting. We found a few rifles and some boxes of Mauser ammunition in the Court House, besides a considerable quantity of ammunition in the deserted laager. Perhaps the most important find we made was a lot of correspondence in the waggons which threw a good deal of light upon the proceedings of the local rebels. This was all sent to Cape Town to the Intelligence Department.

I had previously asked that Lt Col Levy of the Transkeian Civil Service might be sent to assist me in the civil administration of the district when occupied. He now arrived and soon began to put things in order. In a few days the railway was repaired and that source of anxiety was done with. During the Dutch occupation a good deal of looting went on, and complaints were made by the English population of their losses; as it was scarcely desirable to imprison the culprits for theft, Levy issued a notice that if all looted property were sent in by the following day no further notice would be taken of the matter.  On going to my office the next morning, I found an immense mass of miscellaneous articles – pianos, chest of drawers and other things piled up in the Court House stoep. I found on inquiry that this was the plunder; the owners came, selected their property and then there was an end of the matter as far as the Europeans were concerned; but while standing on the stoep of the Court House the following day I saw two native policemen go into a house close by and immediately afterwards heard women shrieking and kicking up a tremendous row. Fearing some outrage I sent an officer who was with me and some men to see what was the matter. The officer came back laughing and told me the women, who were Dutch women were resisting violently the Native policemen who had come to claim and recover their saddles and other property which had been taken by these women’s husbands, who were on Commando, from the huts occupied by the natives in the location.

As I had some hope of inducing the commando which had been driven out of Dordrecht to surrender on certain terms which I understood at that time I was empowered to offer, I called as soon as I entered the village upon the Dutch Minister to ask him to assist me in communicating with the enemy. I am afraid that without meaning it, I frightened him terribly; I have seldom seen a man in such a state of nervous terror. He promised however to go with a message from me to the commando, and went in fact shortly afterwards, but with no satisfactory result. A young man named Smith then came in with a white flag on some pretext; when along with me he informed me that his real business was to ascertain on what terms those who were inclined to surrender could come in. I told him the terms which I believed myself authorised to offer, but subsequently discovered I had exceeded my instructions and had to send a message to that effect to the command.

On this occasion I sent Mr Graemlee who was with us in the capacity of special correspondent to the Times. He volunteered for the duty, and both at this time and later on his knowledge of Dutch and the people was of great use to me. Having got our supplies up by the restored railway I now had to consider how I could move forward towards Burghersdorp or Aliwal in pursuance of my original plan.  I had ascertained that the enemy after having been driven out of Dordrecht had taken up a very strong position at a place called Labuschagne’s Nek about eight miles form Dordrecht where the road to Barkley East crosses the continuation of the range of mountains behind the village.  They had been reinforced by a strong body of Boers from Stormberg.  It was evident that I should have to drive them out of this position before attempting to advance; I therefore directed Major Maxwell to reconnoitre the position as thoroughly as possible, and at the same time got all the information I could obtain from Mr Clark who knew the ground well.

We discovered from natives that a Boer picket was posted on the highest point of the mountain at daybreak every morning.  Acting upon this I determined to seize the position thus indicted as an important one, during the night. I arranged that Major Maxwell should command the force destined for the rear attack, guided by Mr Clark, and that I would make a feint on the pass itself to prevent the higher point from being reinforced.  We arranged to leave camp at about midnight on the 3rd March; at the last moment one of those accidents which it is impossible to see very nearly upset our plans. We had most of us turned in early so to get a few hours sleep before the hard work which we expected. At about 11 a.m. a shot was heard, then another and another, followed by a regular fusillade; I naturally thought that our friends the Boers had turned the tables on us and were attacking the camp. We had two camps one the head quarters camp in a hollow and the main camp immediately above it.  We of course fell in the men and were ready for eventualities, but as the outlying pickets had made no sign I came to the conclusion that it was a false alarm. We soon got a message from the main camp explaining what was wrong.  It appeared that an officer who had been drinking very heavily for some time had suddenly run ‘amuck’, had fired his revolver, and when an attempt was made to secure him, had jumped on his horse and again fired on a sentry who tried to stop him, the result being that every sentry in turn blazed at him as he galloped through the camp. It now became a question whether it would not be best to put off the attack for another night, as the Boers might have been alarmed by the firing.  

I determined however to go on, as I did not think it likely, even if the firing had been heard that the Boers would connect it with any special move on our part.  So we started at the time originally intended.  General Gatacre had followed me to take two companies of the Rolay Scots and Two fifteen pounders R.A. with me. We marched quietly on until close to the scene of our attack, listening very carefully for some indication of Maxwell’s progress.  Just before dawn we heard a few shots fired, and as day broke discovered to our great delight that Maxwell was in possession of the highest point of the mountain. Our job now was to make such an attack as would prevent any serious attempt to retake it. We could see a considerable force of the enemy on the Nek and the rugged ground on the side of it; we at once began to shell them with the 15 pounders and sent a line of skirmishers forward consisting of the royal Scots and Owen Thomas’ squadron of 2nd Brabant’s to try to reach the ridge. This they did but I saw that they were so completely enfiladed from the rock to the left of the Nek it would be madness to push them on in that direction. I therefore recalled them; they had five me hit, none of them badly. As our object had been gained and Maxwell was evidently holding his own very well, I sent the infantry and guns back to camp. The enemy were shelling the position now, but without doing much damage.  The great thing now was to strengthen Maxwell as soon as possible, and this I proceeded to do. I got a report from him to the effect that he had only secured the position by ten minutes, the attacking party having twice lost their way in the dark, showing how uncertain night attacks under the most favourable conditions are.

On the night of the 24th the Boers made an attempt to retake their lost position, but Maxwell persistently forced them back, and succeeded after great labour of (sic) getting two of Lukin’s guns dragged up and put into position on the side of the mountain. Lt Schreiber R.E. made a dash at one of the Boer Schanzen and carried it, shooting the last Boer in it with his revolver. The Border Horse under Captain Robertson, who had just marched up from the Colony, came into action and lost two men within five minutes of their arriving on the scene of action. The Boers now perceived that they were rapidly being pushed back, and that their guns must be captured if they held on any longer.  So withdrawing their guns with great smartness, they retreated on all sides.

We pursued for some distance but did d nothing beyond capturing a few rifles and one or two waggons. The Boers admitted having lost heavily, and the Barkley East men went straight back to their homes. There was now nothing to prevent my advance and as we heard that the Stormberg had been evacuated, Aliwal North was clearly the objective I should make for with the hope of saving the bridge, which was one of the few left intact as far as we knew. Our loss in this action had been about twenty-eight causalities very little considering that we had been fighting for thirty-six hours. I had great difficulty in ascertaining which road I should take; but though Oorlogs Poort was the shortest I was assured that the heights on each side of this pass were so steep, it would be impossible for my flankers to move along them, and I was determined not to plunge into any of these defiles without holding the commanding heights on either side, many disasters during the war having been caused by neglect of this precaution. I finally determined to look for myself and, as is often the case, discovered that the local intelligence was not to be relied upon.  As a matter of fact we had no difficulty in securing the heights.  Soon after entering the Poort we passed an English farmhouse, the inmates of which had provided quantities of tea and cake for all those who like to call. They were delighted to see us, as they had been cut off for weeks from the town. We encamped in the pass that night, the road being so bad that we could not get through it with waggons.  I now had with me Captain George Farrar, who had had so much to do with the formation of the Colonial Division; he acted as intelligence officer.  His brother Captain Percy Farrar was serving with the Kaffrarian Rifles.  The next day pushing steadily one, we reached Jamestown which the Boers had only just evacuated.  Here we had a most enthusiastic reception, the loyal ladies even going so far I believe as to embrace some of the advance guard. Unfortunately I came on later so can only speak from hearsay.  We arrested a farmer who had acted as Landdrost during the Boer Occupation, and disarmed a few local rebels.  After staying here for the night we made an eighteen mile march the following day which brought us within eleven miles of Aliwal North.  From here we moved forward very early on the morning of the 11th, and reached small stream running at the foot of a line of hills about six miles from Aliwal. I had fully expected to find these hills held in force and it would have been a very difficult position to take. Finding it unoccupied I concluded that the Boers meant to evacuate Aliwal without fighting. I was sure however that they would try to destroy the bridge, the preservation of which was of the greatest importance to us. I therefore sent a strong advance guard with two guns under Col. Henderson (1st Brabant’s) with instructions to approach the town with care, to attempt to seize the bridge and hold it, but on no account to go beyond the bridge until I cam up with the main body.  The waggons had to be outspanned, and the oxen allowed to feed before going further, and we all proceeded to get some breakfast. Before we had finished we heard the reports of the guns; I hurried everyone up, got the men mounted and, leaving the rear guard in charge of the transport, started at once for Aliwal.  We had scarcely ridden a couple of miles when we metsome people from Aliwal who had driven out to meet us and who told us that the last of the Boers were leaving Aliwal when our men came up and drove them in a great hurry across the bridge.  I now began to feel anxious, fearing that Henderson would go too far and get into difficulties. We pushed on at a sharp pace, and soon after met Captain George Farrar galloping in hot haste. He shouted to me as soon as he was near enough that our men were in the Free State, and that there was a Boer Laager in sight.  I am afraid that I used some unparliamentary language for I felt that what I had feared had happened.  I went on then at a gallop until we reached Aliwal.  It was Sunday morning and the people should have been in church, but the Clergyman afterwards confided to me that on this occasion for the first time in his life he conducted a service without a congregation. We galloped through the town and across the bridge as we could see our advance guard engaging the enemy on the other side of the river.  When we reached the spot where Lukin’s guns were posted, we found that, exactly as I had anticipated, one of the squadrons had got into a position from which I saw it would be difficult to extricate it.  

Our guns had been pounding away at the Boer Laager about four or five thousand yards from us. To complicate matters the Boers now brought up two guns on our left flank and shelled us persistently.  I at once ordered the withdrawal of the squadron which was in danger, which was affected with a good deal of trouble and some lose, one man supposed to be mortally wounded being left on the ground. The Boers seeing us falling back pressed us hard and tried to creep up along the right bank of the river. But by occupying an empty mill on the left bank we at last succeeded in withdrawing to a position which covered the bridge, and we immediately entrenched ourselves.  The enemy’s shells struck the bridge and one or two of the buildings beyond it but did no serious damage. I felt quite sure that we could hold the bridge, as the position covering it on the Free State side was a very good one.  We had about twenty to twenty-five casualties, which might have been avoided had my orders been strictly carried out; but the temptation to follow up and attack a retreating enemy was too strong. As soon as I was assured that there was no danger of anything like a reverse and that the bridge was safe I went to the principal hotel to get some dinner, and was met by the landlady who seized both my hands and shook them vigorously saying, ‘I don’t know what General you are, but I thank you from the bottom of my heart’. She proceeded to show her gratitude by giving me an excellent dinner.  She told me various stories of the Boer occupation, one of which, relating to an experience of her own, is worth relating. The poor old lady had been charged with some trifling breach of Martial Law and was had up before the acting Landdrost. She claimed the right to give evidence on her own behalf.  There are two methods of swearing a witness in South Africa, kissing the Bible or holding up two fingers; so the Landdrost asked her ‘how do you swear usually Mrs N’. ‘That entirely depends on the amount of provocation I receive’ was the reply.  Whether this was looked upon as contempt of court of not she did not tell me.  Whilst I was on the other side of the river a lively scene had been taking place in the town.  I had left Major Owen Thomas with instruction to arrest any Boer officials he might find.  He arrested the late mayor who was accused of having acted as a sort of magistrate, and in that capacity was stated to have treated the English women who had been left there very harshly. At all events they had a grievance against him and turned out and tried to kick him up the street, Major Thomas had to intervene to prevent their seriously ill treating him.

We too the public school – an excellent building for the purpose – as a hospital; the ladies of Aliwal volunteered to act as nurses and provide delicacies for the men.  When I went to see the wounded the next morning I found them in excellent spirits, and they assured me they were most comfortable.  I think that each man had about three nurses; the result was excellent, for although the wounds were exceptionally severe they all made good recoveries and not a man who was brought into the hospital alive died. One officer I was assured could not possibly live through the night, yet he recovered and in less than a month he walked down to the railway station without assistance. During this war, whether from the skill of the surgeons or the excellent climate, or good nursing, the proportion of men who have recovered from wounds which would formerly have been considered mortal has been wonderful.

We had now to wait for a few days to get the railway put into working order.  This was however, effected and we heard about the same time that General Gatacre had taken the bridge at Bethulie.  I forgot to mention that on examining the bridge at Aliwal we found that an attempt by the enemy had been made to blow it up, but the hard concrete of which the piers were constructed took so long to drill that we arrived before they could affect their purpose. Soon after our arrival in Aliwal I received a letter from Commandant Olivier asking me to prevent any looting of farmhouses in the Free State; as he said something of the kind had already taken place, I made enquiries as to the looting and found that a house had been partially looted because one of our men had been killed from it in the action of the 11th, it was believed from a shot fired from a woman in the house. I took the opportunity of writing a letter to Olivier pointing out to him the folly of keeping the Colonial rebels with him, who I knew were anxious to surrender, and whom the authorities were prepared to allow to return to their farms on very easy conditions. Olivier acceded to this, and in a day or two some hundred of rebels, in many cases with their wives and families, presented themselves at the bridge head and surrendered.  Captain Farrar and Hall undertook the work of registering them and making them take the oath of neutrality. After this George Farrar insisted on my addressing a few words of warning and advice to each batch. I got very tired of this, and Lord Wolverton who was with us at the time kindly acted for me on one or two occasions. It was melancholy to see these people, who seemed to be of a very low type of humanity; in one batch of about two hundred and fifty there were no less than seven idiots. When one of the leading Field Cornets was remonstrated with on cruelty of bringing such persons into the field, his reply was that they could fire a rifle as well as anyone else. There were seventy boys not more than twelve years of age.  At this time these rebels were very penitent and declared that nothing would induce them to take up arms again. But most of them I am afraid have broken their oaths and forgotten their promises, and have gone into the field again.  We had in pursuance of orders arrested a good many of the inhabitants of the district suspected of high treason; and Mr Hugo the high commissioner, who had returned with us to Aliwal, assisted by Captains Farrar and Hall were busily engaged in collecting evidence against these people. In the meanwhile we got information that the Boers were retiring northwards, and I soon received instructions to occupy Rouxville, a village about 25 miles north of Aliwal.  This was done, and Zastron to the east was also taken. Reddersburg and the villages to the west held by General Gatacre. Smithsfield was also held by a mixed force of two squadrons of the Colonial Division and some infantry.  Just before this force left, H.E. the high commissioner came up to Aliwal.  We had a grand field day and he inspected the division.  He was particularly struck and amused at the style in which our gun teams galloped by.  The mules I may remark were selected in Queenstown by Captain Lukin, and owing to the care taken of them kept in excellent condition through the campaign showing that they were better adapted to the work than the horses.

Chapter 12

I had now orders to send a force on to Wepener to guard the bridge at Jammersburg Drift.  I sent the 1st Brabant’s and some of the C.M.R. with guns. I directed Major Maxwell to select a position which would if held ensure the safety of the bridge.  This he did most skilfully.  Unfortunately, owing to the formation of the country, it was necessary to make lines to be held not less than seven miles in length. Hearing that the Boers were contemplating an attack I hurried up reinforcements as fast as possible until the whole force assembled at Jammerstown amounted to about 7750 of all ranks, with all the guns, seven in number which I had then at my disposal. On the 9th April (all outposts having been called in) the Boers began their attack.  Our force consisted of the C.M.R. with their artillery, the Kaffrarian Rifles, 1st and 2nd Brabant’s Horse and Driscol’s Scouts; and in addition of a small party of Royal Engineers attached to the Colonial division and a company of the Royal Scots.  The guns were two 15 pounders, two 17 pounders, one Hotchkiss 13 pounder and two Naval 12 pounders (8cwt).  The first attack made by the Boers shewed that the defences were insufficient, the losses on our side being heavy. On that night and on the two or three following it, great exertions were made to extend and improve the trenches; the men having once taken up their positions had to remain there day and night. There was no reserve and no possibility of relieving them.  They were unable to get any food during the day, as the open ground between their regiments and their cooking places was so swept by the fire of the enemy that no living thing could cross it; their food therefore had to be conveyed to the trenches after dark. To add to their troubles, heavy rains filled the trenches knee-deep in water.  The Boers made their night attacks on the weakest part of the defences which was held by the C.M.R. but in every case after getting within sixty yards of the trenches they were compelled to retire.  In the meantime the position of the force, surrounded as it was by a force of Boers then estimated at 8000 strong, but now known on the best authority to have been 11000 with eight guns, was causing great anxiety.  General Rundel with his division moved from the north-west via de Wit’s Dorp to try and relieve them.  I had offered to try and make a dash with the 1200 mounted men and two guns by way of Bushman’s Kop but this was, wisely I think, refused. Finally Lord Kitchener himself came to Aliwal accompanied by General Fitzroy Hart’s brigade of infantry directed me to advance supported by General Hart, and handed over to me as an addition to my force, the 3rd contingent of New Zealanders under Major Iowsey, and a company of mounted infantry made up of volunteers from the Malta garrison and called the Malta Mounted Infantry, under the command of Captain Pinecoffin.  This company from its being composed of small detachments of different regiments was not thought much of at first, turned out an excellent addition to our column, due to the fact that its C.O. Captain Pinecoffin, was a man of strong common sense and no prejudices.  They picked up our colonial methods of fighting and scouting, and in a very short time showed a wonderful confidence in getting about the country – a strong proof to my mind that the British soldier in capable hands soon develops the initiative and individualism, of the want of which he is so often accused. Our first day’s march from Aliwal was decidedly an uncomfortable one; rain began soon after we started, the heavily laden waggons struggled through the mud with great difficulty and it was dark by the time we reached our first halting place. Only one or two waggons were up and we could only get a little biscuit and some cocoa by way of supper.  We then crawled under the waggons packed as closely as possible without distinction of persons, officers and waggon boys alike glad to get a little shelter from the pouring rain. To add to our discomfort and anxiety, soon after dark we heard our advanced guard who had been pushed on some three miles ahead, firing heavily and evidently being replied to by the enemy; this however soon ceased and one or two men coming in informed us that they had blundered into the Boers in the dark, both parties being equally surprised.  Fortunately no harm was done except that some of the men lost their way and did not find us until daylight. The next morning was fine and we reached Rouxville in good time, the small body of Boers who had been encountered by our advance guard on the previous night falling back before us and eventually disappearing.  

Here we waited a day for the infantry who could not of course march as quickly as we could.  We then again advanced and after a couple of days reached Bushman’s Kop which we found occupied by the Boers in some strength with two guns, one pom-pom and a couple of Maxims.  I proposed that General Hart should hold the Boers in front with his infantry while I with the mounted men swept round their right flank.  To this after he had made a sketch of the position, agreed.  He gave me a battalion of infantry to hold a small line of kopjes connecting my left flank with his right. As soon as they were posted we galloped off in a wildly extended line. The Border Horse and the New Zealand contingent on the extreme right soon threatened the Boer line of retreat.  The Boers then began to withdraw their guns; unfortunately by only two guns, a section of Colonel Ingelsby’s battery of Cape Field Artillery, had to be left to defend the camp, so we were compelled to allow them to withdraw their guns without any serious opposition. The position however was gained.  It was dark before I gained the waggons and I was most grateful to one of the war correspondents whom I luckily met- Mr Belloch – who kindly gave me something to eat and drink. My servant turning up, I got a comfortable shakedown in a waggon. We moved on the following morning and the next day arrived at a place close to the borders of Basutoland, where we again found the enemy awaiting us in a strong position. We adopted the same tactics as at Bushman’s Kop, I moved round well to the right, close to the Basutoland Boundary.  Luckily I had my two guns with me on this occasion.  The Boers held a mountain commanding the road to Wepener.  From this a ridge ran to the Basutoland border; this ridge I had to take so as to turn their position.  I moved up to it with the New Zealanders and Border Horse extended. As soon as we began to mount the ridge we were fired upon at long range from the mountain.  Leaving a small force to protect our flank I moved on, feeling sure that we were close upon the enemy. I was galloping along the line shouting to the men to open out more, when we came suddenly on a line of Boers lying down just below the crest of the ridge who at once opened a tremendous fire. For moment there was only one thing to do and that was to get under cover; jumping off our horses we made for a barbed wire fence behind which there was a sufficient depression to give us shelter.  Strange to say although we were within a hundred and eighty yards of them, and they emptied their magazines at us, not one was hit, the casualties which now began to occur being from the long range firing from the flank. I now sent for the guns; there were under the command of Lieut. Janish, Cape Field Artillery. Neither he nor the majority of his men had ever been under fire before and I was naturally somewhat anxious as to how they would stand the severe test to which they were to be exposed. Splendidly did they answer the question asked of them.  The guns were brought into position and fired at a range of 450 yards under a tremendous rifle fire as coolly as if they had been on parade.  At the same (time) a very pretty bit of firing was going on.  The Border Horse composed principally of frontier farmers had, like all of us, taken shelter from the first tremendous volley, but the moment they had got temporary cover they jumped off their horses and without any order each man ran back on his hands and knees through a mealie field to the crest of the ridge. Here in conjunction with the shell fire of the guns, they steadily drove the Boer line of skirmishers down the hill, and having cleared our front they swerved round to the right and with the New Zealanders slowly but surely forced the enemy back along the ridge.  The guns meanwhile were shelling the mountain of which we were now partly in rear.  We saw a cart of four horses standing below the top of the mountain; taking this as a target, one shell burst well beyond, the next far behind it.  The third however was very close, and we saw the cart and horses flying over the hills.  What became of them we couldn’t tell, but the Boer position had become untenable and advancing to the extreme end of the ridge we found the country to our left completely clear.  Looking down the valley below us we saw a large farmhouse surrounded by trees, and a few Boers moving round it. I suspected there were more men there than we could see, and ordering up one of the guns directed the officer in command to put a shell as near the house, about 4000 yards from us, as he could. As soon as the shell burst hundreds of Boers poured out of the house and from the plantation surrounding it, and cleared off in haste along a white road, which stretched away towards Wepener.  On this road there was nothing to be seen except a cloud of dust raised by the flying horsemen. We hurried them up by dropping a few shells among them until they got out of range.  The enemy having disappeared I returned to camp, where I found to my annoyance that all the baggage had been ordered into Basutoland,and my tent was on the point of being struck.  This I arranged; but in the morning instead of moving the ammunition, etc along the main road which we had cleared, General Hart moved along a bad road at the back of the mountain, and got the waggons bogged, which delayed us for hours.  However we finally got away, and on the road received a helio from Colonel Dalgety saying that the Boers had raised the siege and retreated northward, and that the road into the camp at Jammersburg was clear. We pushed on therefore to Wepener, and General Hart asked me to ride over to the camp with him to congratulate the garrison on their successful defence.  We could not find Colonel Dalgety but General Hart made a short speech to the few men who could be got together, and we returned to Wepener.  The state of the ground held by the garrison was very bad.  In all directions dead horses and dead oxen were to be seen, and the odour was naturally very trying. It was difficult to select a camping ground for our men, who were to move up as soon as possible. The next day General Hart received orders to move down to the sought of the Free State and much to my – and I may add their – regret the New Zealanders left us here, being ordered to accompany General Hart together with Pinecoffin’s mounted infantry. I was ordered to get my men remounted, to proceed north and to get into touch with General Sir Rundel.  I was told when I had done this to occupy Newburg’s Mills on the Leeuw River.  I marched on therefore for three days going very easily.  We were short of horses although we had got some Basuto Ponies at Wepener, which turned out very useful animals.I could hear nothing of General Rundle and halted at a point overlooking Thabe Patchoa, a large mountain near the Leeuw River. Here I found the enemy again in force, but could not ascertain even approximately how many there were. My position was a strong one, and I determined to wait for instructions, failing to get a helio from General Rundle. There was some awkward country in front and as for aught I knew, de Wet with his whole force might be there, I sent out a reconnaissance under Colonel Maxwell. They recognised the uniform of the German Auxiliaries which proved pretty clearly that they had guns.  In a day or two I got an answer to my request for instructions, ordering me to fall back from my position and move round by de Wit’s dorp to Thaba ‘Nchu where General Rundle had fled his headquarters.  I proceeded to carry out these orders.  On marching off early in the morning, an unfortunate incident occurred.  An officer had been detailed to seethat the outlying pickets were withdrawn; unfortunately the duty was partially neglected and a sergeant and five men were left unwarned, the result being that the Boers entered the abandoned camp on our departure, surprised the picket, killed two men and captured the third, the sergeant and two men escaping into Basutoland. The poor fellow who was captured was partially stripped and told to move on; when he had walked about fifty yards he was deliberately shot. Although badly wounded in two places, he had sufficient presence of mind to lie perfectly still. The two Boers who had shot him came up and kicked him to see if he was still alive; he still lay quiet, and supposing him dead they left him. As soon as it was dark he crept away on hands and knees and was picked up the following morning by one of our patrols. He was for a long time in hospital in Mafeking but eventually recovered.  This was no doubt the work of some of the scoundrels who are to be found among all large bodies of men.  I have never found the commandants or responsible leaders among the Boers guilty of countenancing such acts as these.

We had now to retrace our steps for some distance and then turn to the north-west.  We halted for a day at de Wet’s dorp, where we picked up a squadron of Yeomanry and some waggons for Taba ‘Nchu. We heard of Boers being on the road between us and Taba ‘Nchu but only saw a small body who retired in a great hurry. On getting into the neighbourhood of Thab ‘Nchu we found that an infantry brigade had been sent to see us safe into the headquarters camp. We encamped near a small stream where there were some very unpleasant evidences off a recent fight in the shape of dead horses lying in the river. We also found lances and various articles of equipment.  The following day we entered Thaba ‘Nchu in state, all the troops available lining the streets. General Sir Leslie Rundle did all he could for us, and was most kind and considerate. He insisted on my taking possession of a commandeered house. As a matter of fact I would have far rather gone into camp. However, it was lucky that I took it, as the next day one of my officers, Captain Robertson, and the Sergeant Major of the Border Horse developed enteric. We at first handed them over to the field hospital of the 8th Division, but on going to visit them in the afternoon Colonel Hartley our P.M.O. found they had had nothing to eat since their admission. So I at once gave up my house, which was turned into a hospital, and I had the satisfaction of hearing later on that they had recovered sufficiently to be sent down country.  After remaining at Thaba ‘Nchu for three days we moved on in the direction of Ladybrand, patrolling the country en route pretty thoroughly, Colonel Grenfell with the 2nd Brabant’s going to Leeuw River Mills and Colonel Crewe with his regiment, the Border Horse, to a group of hills on our left flank. Nothing however came of these moves and we got within about fourteen miles of Ladybrand without having encountered the enemy, who seemed to have cleared to the north east. An absurd incident occurred here; two non-commissioned officers wandered into Ladybrand, went up to the principal hotel, called upon a lot of Dutchmen to give up arms (which they did believing we were close behind them) took possession of the gaol and gaoler, and actually brought fifty strand of arms in a commandeered cart to me. It was altogether the most successful piece of bluff, but I could not praise the men for the trick they had played, seeing that they had no right to go into the village without my permission, nor could I well ‘wig’ them for such a successful enterprise.

Some Yeomanry had been sent up to occupy Ladybrand, a Commandant was appointed, and the district was pacified for the time.  We were now ordered to march to a place called Clocolan, an open plain terribly cold and bleak. May in the Orange River Colony is a cold month, and there were sharp frosts every night.  In the neighbourhood of Clocolan is a find place belonging to Mr Newbery the proprietor of the Leeuw River mills.  It was surprising to find a handsome stone house, most tastefully furnished, some of du Maurier’s original sketches on the walls and a general air of comfort one did not certainly expect in such an out of the way place.  I may remark that the country round here, indeed the whole of the country from Aliwal North upwards for about thirty or forty miles west of the Basutoland border is very rich and well adapted for both stock and agricultural farming.  No irrigation is required  for wheat and grain crops north of Wepener, you see miles of wheat fields on all sides as you travel through what is know as the Conquered Country’, and when the railways which were planned by the late Free State government are completed there will be a great development of the country resources.  The climate is probably the finest in Africa – cold and bracing but with clear warm days even in winter.  The scenery is fine, the country being mountainous and with many kopjes of the quaintest shapes scattered about it.  It is true that trees are wanting but that is a want that can be supplied.  Mr Newbery’s estate has many fine plantations on it and every year he plants some thousands of young trees. At the time we visited this beautiful place no damage had been done to the house or the plantations and I sincerely hope that escaped unscathed to the end of the war.

From Clocolan we were ordered to occupy Ficksburg, a village on the Basutoland  border, about eighteen miles from Clocolan.  As I ascertained that to move by the shortest road to Ficksburg would involve marching through a exceptionally dangerous pass about five miles in length, I determined to avoid it by marching round by a road somewhat longer but more open, this I did, but on completing the first day’s march at a place called Hammonia I received orders from Sir Leslie Rundle to remain there with the headquarters of the Division, and to occupy Ficksburg with only a small force. This was done, no resistance was offered and a position was selected jut outside Ficksburg which was roughly entrenched.  We were aware that there was a strong body of the enemy in our immediate neighbourhood, but I must confess that at this time I underestimated the forces opposed to us.  Whatever their strength might be, it was evident that they held a series of strong positions, covering the large valley which is known as the Brandwater Basin, a very rich and well watered country only accessible by four passes, all of which were capable of defence by a small force. I sent Colonel Maxwell into Basutoland to reconnoitre the position occupied by the Boers in one of these passes about six miles from Ficksburg.  By crossing the Caledon River into Basutoland he was able to get at the back of the position and his report was to the effect that it could easily be taken from Basutoland but was too strong to be attacked with any prospect of success from our side. As political considerations prevented us from making use of Basutoland we were obliged to give up the idea of advancing in this particular direction.  I sent out one or two patrols to feel for the enemy and ascertain if there was any unguarded pass further to the westward which would afford an opening.  Every point of importance however was well guarded against such a force as was at my disposal.  Two small patrols sent out with my knowledge were, owing to the over confidence of the Subaltern in command and the men themselves, cut up and the majority taken prisoners.  I was very much annoyed at this, but it was due to the fact that a long series of successes had made the men of the Colonial Division believe themselves invincible; this of course is an excellent thing; men who believe that they cannot be beaten are very difficult to beat, but it may be carried too far, as on this occasion.  Sir Leslie Rundle now arrived with a strong force; previous to his coming I had opened negotiations with Commandant de Villiers formerly an attorney in Ficksburg, who now commanded the Boers in our District, I had reason to believe that personally he was tired of the war and was inclined to surrender upon honourable terms; he stated finally that he could not think without the consent of his superior officers. I gladly handed over the whole affair to General Rundle, nothing however came of it, and General Rundle, posting a brigade of infantry at Harmonia, sent me with the bulk of the division about 25 miles on the road to Senekal. Before we left, the Boers had attacked the post near Ficksburg and shelled for several days in succession but without effect.  I must not forget to add that at Harmonia we heard of the occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria by Lord Robert’s army and great rejoicing in camp resulted.  A huge bonfire was lit, the material being furnished by a great stack of straw. Harmonia was really composed of a large mill with a few houses around it, and the straw was the property of a neighbouring farmer, great quantities of grain, chiefly wheat, being grown in this neighbourhood.  The miller Mr Ballantyne, was a thoroughly loyal Scotchman who had I fear suffered much on account of his loyalty.  I have every reason to be grateful both to him and his wife, for they did all they could for us, Mrs Ballantyne sending me some admirably cooked dinners on several occasions, which I enjoyed throughly after the somewhat rough fare to which I had been accustomed for some months, and I must say I left Harmonia with great regret. We had a good deal of trouble with our horses owing to an outbreak of pink eye; most of the horses recovered, it is true, from the disease itself, mainly owing to the skill of Captain Campbell, our vet but it left them weak and unfit for hard work and it was practically impossible to get them into condition again during the very cold weather which prevailed; we were indeed sadly short of horses; the question of mounting the forces was a difficult one throughout the whole war.

We found the Basuto ponies, small though some of them were, the best adapted to the work. They were extremely hardy and accustomed to a cold mountain climate standing exposure better than any other horse that I have had any experience of. I hope that one of the results of the war will be the establishment of large remount farms in some of the many districts of South Africa which are especially suitable for horse breeding, but the subject is too large a one to be dealt with here.

One new camp was in fairly open country, well out of the range of the line of hills held by the Boers, which were to the east of us; there was a flat topped mountain about four miles from us which had a line of basaltic columns all round it giving it a very quaint appearance.  Some of our officers who visited it brought back some interesting gossel-fish so perfect that you could count the scales on them. Our principal adventure here was the descent of a small Boer Command from the hills upon some farms some three or four miles from our camp.  I sent out a strong patrol under Colonel Dalgety with two guns to find out the strength of the Boer force and to hold them if possible until General Rundle to whom I at once reported, could come up with reinforcements.  Unfortunately one of the guns broke down and Colonel Dalgety thought it necessary to come back to camp with it, instead of watching the enemy at night. Before morning the Boers were off the hills again.

Another forward movement was now ordered and I was directed to take up a position about three miles from the village or town of Senecal. I accordingly marched and after meeting some slight opposition safely reached the strong position on the Senekal road. A good deal of marching and counter marching went on at this time, with the object of which I was then and still am very imperfectly acquainted.  I had urged upon General Rundel the views I held as to the desirability of advancing to Bethlehem. I pointed out that the possession of this town was of the greatest importance and that it was the key of the position; that I was right, after events have I think fully proved.  General Rundle reported to Lord Roberts what I had said on the subject.  I had hoped that I should have been employed in this move I had suggested, but unfortunately that was not to be. We returned to our camp, but only remained there a short time. We again occupied our old camp on the Senekal road.  The enemy were very near us here and on one or two occasions sniped at our conveys passing into Seneal, which was occupied by General Campbell’s brigade for a few days, General Clements having moved westward to cover certain conveys coming from Windburg on the line of railway.

General Rundle having pitched his camp near us determined on dislodging the Boers from a farm house held by them, which was close under the hills which they occupied; we accordingly sent Colonel Grenfell to the end of a large donga which formed their principal cover, and shelled the farm buildings in which it was supposed a good many Boers had placed themselves. To the right a body of Yeomanry were sent to prevent any help coming to the Boers from that quarter. Grenfell’s men advancing on both sides of the donga soon drove out its defenders and our men were then able to cross it and take possession of the farm house, a very good one and well furnished. I had always been opposed to the burning of farm homesteads.  I could not see that any good was likely to be done by it, especially when carried out by men who were ignorant of the country, and who were not likely to make any distinction or trouble themselves to inquire who was the owner of the house or houses burnt. An incident that occurred this day shewed what was likely to happen and what did actually happen. The farm house was ordered to be burnt to the ground that some men of the Yeomanry had been previously fired upon from it and one or two killed. It appeared however afterwards that the house burnt was not the one from which the men had been fired upon but that on the contrary it belonged to a man who had given himself up and was then living in Senekal under our protection; and worst still his wife had actually nursed two of our men through an attack of enteric and had shewn them every kindness in her power.  The man came to me and I did what I could to help him by giving him a letter setting forth the facts and suggesting that he should be compensated.  I heard soon afterwards that the Captain of the troop to which the two men belonged who had been nursed by the owner’s wife, himself gave her one hundred guineas and started a subscription for her; but I am afraid all would a very short way towards repairing the damage done.

Chapter 13 

A few days after this I was ordered into Senekal where I relieved General Campbell.  A few days after this I was ordered into Senekal where I relieved General Campbell.  There is a hill above Senekal furnishing a very strong position for the defence of the town; this we occupied and pitched our headquarters camp on the other side of the Sand River.  I was now ordered to hand over the 2nd Brabant’s to General Clements to whose column it was in future to belong. I must say I obeyed this order with the greatest reluctance; the regiment was the finest in the division, with the exception of the C.M.R. Colonel Grenfell had proved himself an excellent C.O.  and altogether I felt very much what I realised was the beginning of the breaking up of the colonial division. A few days after having handed over Colonel Grenfell’s regiment I was told that he was ordered to attack a Boer Laager which had been located a few miles from Senekal.  He had a force of Yeomanry and two R.A. guns in addition to his own regiment. I heard with surprise and concern that he had been ordered to make a night march in order to surprise the laager. In the morning we heard heavy gun fire in the direction in which we supposed he had gone.  As soon as the sun was up I got a helio message from him saying that he was surrounded by the Boers, had already had a good many casualties, was running short of ammunition and asked for assistance. Ours was the only force available, as General clements was still away to the westward. I at once ordered every available man (with four guns) to urn out, and in a very short time we were ready to start.  For some distance the road was good and we were able to move at a steady gallop. In less than an hour from the time of leaving camp we reached an open plain with a ridge beyond it, along this ridge we could see the Boers moving along in some numbers.  The 2nd Brabant’s and Border Horse moved across the open ground in extended order; but the Boers were there in force, and opening a heavy fire, compelled our men to fall back out of range. We had already however relieved Colonel Grenfell.  The Boers being afraid of having their retreat along the ridge cut off, drew off their guns and began to shell us; our guns having taken up a position replied but the Boers soon had enough of this and began to retreat. Although I had sent Major Fielden well away on their left flank hoping to force them to stand, nothing more could be done. On ascertaining from Grenfell what had happened I found as I had expected that he had marched in the darkness some what further than he should have done, and had found himself at daybreak on the wrong side of the larger and in a very awkward position. A troop of Yeomanry were panic struck and fairly bolted, never stopping until they reached the railway line north of Winburg, where they reported that the whole of the colonial division had been cut up. The R.A. behaved with the greatest courage, as indeed from my experience they always do. The subaltern in command, whose name I regret to say I have forgotten, although badly wounded fought until he fainted from loss of blood.  One gun lost all its men but one bombardier, by the bursting of a shell. The bombardier sat stolidly by the lumber of his gun until a sergeant of the 2nd Brabant’s and some of the same regiment, who had luckily been trained as artillerymen, volunteered to work the gun. The affair might have ended in a disaster and it was another example of the danger of attempting night marches into the enemy’s country without full knowledge of his strength and positions held by him. We were now ordered to march to a point half way between Senekal and Winburg. It was supposed the enemy were in some force on a hill or rather range of hills called the Doornburg, from which I was directed to drive them. We had a slight skirmish the day we came into our camp, in which one or two men were wounded. The following day however they retired and we took possession of the range, meeting there a strong patrol of Imperial troops coming from the main line of the railway.

At this time I received a telegram from the High Commissioner through Lord Roberts, asking me to proceed to Cape Town to attend parliament, as it was essential that as many of the Progressive and Loyal members should be there as it was possible to get to attend. I therefore had to make preparations to get down to Winburg, taking a rail from there to the main line and from there to Cape Town.  I was very much disgusted to leave the scene of active operations and should have been still more so had I been aware that I was not to come back. I drove over in the Cape Cart to Winburg, getting there just in time to catch a train. We should not however have caught the connecting train at Smalldeel junction had it not been that the driver of the train happened to know me and, as he afterwards boasted, drove the train faster than ever a train had been driven on that line before. As a result we were saved a weary wait at Smalldeel and reached Bloemfontein that night. Here I was able by the kindness of my old friend Mr Atherstone, late of the Free State Railway Service, to pass a very comfortable night in his house close to the station.  The journey to Cape Town was slow but fairly comfortable.  Colonel Tamplin my A.D.C. and I had been so accustomed to the hardships of campaigning that we were able to bear a good deal of discomfort without a desire to grumble. On our arrival in Cape Town we found that the political situation was a very peculiar one; Mr Schreiner, late Prime Minister, had resigned in consequence of a difference of opinion between himself and the more pronounced Pro-Boers of the party he had led. The Ministry, of which my colleague Sir Gordon Sprigg was Premier, was entirely dependent for its existence and its power of passing the absolutely necessary acts of indemnity etc. upon the votes of the five or six men who had adhered to Schreiner. These included Mr Solomon, late Attorney-General, Mr Wessels, and Mr Sonnenburg, late members for Vryburg; and Mr Botha (later on) member for Aliwal. Besides the Indemnity Act had to be passed for the punishment of rebels.  The Schreiner group insisted upon including this in the indemnity act, as that to get the first act passed we were obliged to vote for the second as well. This went sorely against the grain with many of us.  The new Act proposed to limit the punishment of rebels, with the exception of actual leaders, to five years loss of political rights – a totally inadequate punishment; it had to be done however. Special

A few days after this I was ordered into Senekal where I relieved General Campbell.  There is a hill above Senekal furnishing a very strong position for the defence of the town; this we occupied and pitched our headquarters camp on the other side of the Sand River.  I was now ordered to hand over the 2nd Brabant’s to General Clements to whose column it was in future to belong. I must say I obeyed this order with the greatest reluctance; the regiment was the finest in the division, with the exception of the C.M.R. Colonel Grenfell had proved himself an excellent C.O.  and altogether I felt very much what I realised was the beginning of the breaking up of the colonial division. A few days after having handed over Colonel Grenfell’s regiment I was told that he was ordered to attack a Boer Laager which had been located a few miles from Senekal.  He had a force of Yeomanry and two R.A. guns in addition to his own regiment. I heard with surprise and concern that he had been ordered to make a night march in order to surprise the laager. In the morning we heard heavy gun fire in the direction in which we supposed he had gone.  As soon as the sun was up I got a helio message from him saying that he was surrounded by the Boers, had already had a good many casualties, was running short of ammunition and asked for assistance. Ours was the only force available, as General clements was still away to the westward. I at once ordered every available man (with four guns) to urn out, and in a very short time we were ready to start.  For some distance the road was good and we were able to move at a steady gallop. In less than an hour from the time of leaving camp we reached an open plain with a ridge beyond it, along this ridge we could see the Boers moving along in some numbers.  The 2nd Brabant’s and Border Horse moved across the open ground in extended order; but the Boers were there in force, and opening a heavy fire, compelled our men to fall back out of range. We had already however relieved Colonel Grenfell.  The Boers being afraid of having their retreat along the ridge cut off, drew off their guns and began to shell us; our guns having taken up a position replied but the Boers soon had enough of this and began to retreat. Although I had sent Major Fielden well away on their left flank hoping to force them to stand, nothing more could be done. On ascertaining from Grenfell what had happened I found as I had expected that he had marched in the darkness some what further than he should have done, and had found himself at daybreak on the wrong side of the larger and in a very awkward position. A troop of Yeomanry were panic struck and fairly bolted, never stopping until they reached the railway line north of Winburg, where they reported that the whole of the colonial division had been cut up. The R.A. behaved with the greatest courage, as indeed from my experience they always do. The subaltern in command, whose name I regret to say I have forgotten, although badly wounded fought until he fainted from loss of blood.  One gun lost all its men but one bombardier, by the bursting of a shell. The bombardier sat stolidly by the lumber of his gun until a sergeant of the 2nd Brabant’s and some of the same regiment, who had luckily been trained as artillerymen, volunteered to work the gun. The affair might have ended in a disaster and it was another example of the danger of attempting night marches into the enemy’s country without full knowledge of his strength and positions held by him. We were now ordered to march to a point half way between Senekal and Winburg. It was supposed the enemy were in some force on a hill or rather range of hills called the Doornburg, from which I was directed to drive them. We had a slight skirmish the day we came into our camp, in which one or two men were wounded. The following day however they retired and we took possession of the range, meeting there a strong patrol of Imperial troops coming from the main line of the railway.  At this time I received a telegram from the High Commissioner through Lord Roberts, asking me to proceed to Cape Town to attend parliament, as it was essential that as many of the Progressive and Loyal members should be there as it was possible to get to attend. I therefore had to make preparations to get down to Winburg, taking a rail from there to the main line and from there to Cape Town.  I was very much disgusted to leave the scene of active operations and should have been still more so had I been aware that I was not to come back. I drove over in the Cape Cart to Winburg, getting there just in time to catch a train. We should not however have caught the connecting train at Smalldeel junction had it not been that the driver of the train happened to know me and, as he afterwards boasted, drove the train faster than ever a train had been driven on that line before. As a result we were saved a weary wait at Smalldeel and reached Bloemfontein that night. Here I was able by the kindness of my old friend Mr Atherstone, late of the Free State Railway Service, to pass a very comfortable night in his house close to the station.  The journey to Cape Town was slow but fairly comfortable.  Colonel Tamplin my A.D.C. and I had been so accustomed to the hardships of campaigning that we were able to bear a good deal of discomfort without a desire to grumble. On our arrival in Cape Town we found that the political situation was a very peculiar one; Mr Schreiner, late Prime Minister, had resigned in consequence of a difference of opinion between himself and the more pronounced Pro-Boers of the party he had led. The Ministry, of which my colleague Sir Gordon Sprigg was Premier, was entirely dependent for its existence and its power of passing the absolutely necessary acts of indemnity etc. upon the votes of the five or six men who had adhered to Schreiner. These included Mr Solomon, late Attorney-General, Mr Wessels, and Mr Sonnenburg, late members for Vryburg; and Mr Botha (later on) member for Aliwal. Besides the Indemnity Act had to be passed for the punishment of rebels.  The Schreiner group insisted upon including this in the indemnity act, as that to get the first act passed we were obliged to vote for the second as well. This went sorely against the grain with many of us.  The new Act proposed to limit the punishment of rebels, with the exception of actual leaders, to five years loss of political rights – a totally inadequate punishment; it had to be done however. SpecialCourts by another portion of the Act were provided for the trial of rebels.  The Opposition took great exception to the countenance of Martial Law in some districts and a promise was made by the Government that it should be removed as soon as the state of the districts would permit. Some very violent attacks were made by the Opposition on myself and the men I had commanded, who were termed ruffians and bandits and were accused of every crime in the Decalogue. I of course defended myself and the conduct of the Division generally, and was able to shew in nearly every instance the falsehood of the charges brought against them. To my great satisfaction the Dutch members, many of whom were my personal friends and had been so for years, refrained from taking part in these attacks. Indeed when an unusually violent attack was made on me by one of the leaders of the Opposition, one of the Dutch well known for his anti-British views, came to me, and, shaking hands very heartily with me, said I must not suppose that he and the other Dutchmen in the House agreed with what had been said against me. The truth is that the better class of Dutch farmers are inherently gentlemen and very rarely say anything against which they think will unduly hurt the feelings of their political opponents. Would the same could be said about all of us! The unsatisfactory nature of the measures passed during the session is well known and I need say no more about it.  On the conclusion of the session I was sent for to Pretoria, where Lord Roberts informed me that the colonial division having been practically broken up, he wished me to return to Cape Town and superintend the recruiting for the colonial irregular forces. I cannot say that I felt any keen interest in this work, but I was aware that it had to be done and that I should be more successful in obtaining the right class of men than any other officer who was available at the moment, and I still hoped that when I had succeeded in the work assigned to me I might be again employed on active service; unfortunately this was not the case.  I was kept at this work for some months, until the supply of recruits began to fail. The great mistake was made by constantly creating new corps; it would have been far more satisfactory if the old corps had been kept up to their full strength instead of being allowed to die out. Men were constantly tempted to join new regiments with fancy names, the terms of service varying in no degree from those of the older corps.  This certainly did not tend to efficiency.

About this time a new scheme was started by which it was hoped men who could not give their whole time to the Service might be induced to serve within certain areas. The scheme in itself was a good one, but there was a good deal of confusion caused by the clashing of the Imperial and Colonial authorities. The rebellion had spread in the north east districts and a large number of Free Staters had crossed the Orange River in small commandos. Each of these commandos became a nucleus to which rebels were attracted and it was necessary that a determined effort should be made to crush these guerrilla forces. Martial Law was proclaimed over a much larger area of the country than had hitherto been subject to it, and its administration became a great difficulty. I was sent up to the frontier with instructions to arrange for the administration of Martial Law upon some more regular system than had hitherto been attempted and at the same time to organize the new system of local defence.  On arriving at Cradock however I soon found that I had not the power to carry out any effectual reforms in the administration of the law. There were so many people in command – Inspectors of lines of communication, Generals in command of columns, etc. that my position was an impossible one. I went on from Cradock to Graaff Reinet; here I found the same state of affairs.  I saw that had my appointment been a real one and accompanied by authority I could have done good work, made the administration less irritating to the loyal inhabitants and more effective for the purpose it was meant to serve. It was not to be, however, and I was actually wiring to Cape Town asking to be relieved of my impossible work, when I received a telegram ordering me back to Cape Town to take complete charge of the organisation of the local troops under the new system.  At this time Colonel Gorringe R.E. had arrived in Graaff Reinet, having been sent by Lord Kitchener to form a column of local troops to deal with the guerrilla bands in the midland and north east districts.  I gave him of course all the help I could in the way of supplying the names of all those who, I knew, could assist him in raising men. I then started on my journey to Cape Town highly pleased at having escaped from a manifestly false position.  In Cape Town I found there was plenty to do; the regulations published provided for three classes of men who were willing to take a share in the defence of the country. Class A was to include those who were willing to join on condition of being available for service anywhere within the limits of the Colony.  B, those who were willing to serve within certain defined areas made up of about four or five Fiscal Divisions; and C, those who would only agree to defend their own districts or their own town, the latter were to be known as Town Guards.  The men raised under B class were called District Mounted Troops and proved very serviceable on many occasions.  In Cape Town nearly 9000 men were enrolled as Town Guards; they were formed into battalions.  The leading mercantile houses in Cape Town behaved with great liberality in several instances, providing khaki uniforms for their men. They were not only useful for the actual defence of the towns to which they belonged but they fond men for local guards and other duties, thus releasing for more important avocations a considerable number of regular troops.  I ascertained also that in a case of the enemy coming in a distance which would seem to threaten an attack upon Cape Town, at least 2000 men could be relied upon to go to the front and meet the danger. Indeed nearly the whole of the rank and file were prepared to volunteer for such service, it was only the question of obtaining permission from their employers.  The Martial Spirit shewn so late a stage in the war was a confirmation of the opinion I previously held, that if this spirit were encouraged by a judicious system of organization there would be very little necessity in the future to call upon the Mother Country for such sacrifices as we had been compelled to request in the helpless condition in which the beginning of the war found us, when the loyal population was unarmed and disloyal armed and practically organized and prepared for war; for, strange as it may seem to those unacquainted with the state of affairs in South Africa before the war, the officials of the S.A. League were aware, from information obtained from their branches in the disaffected districts, that Field Cornets were actually named who were to assume command of the rebels in case of rising became possible. That curious British optimism which seems to be a characteristic of the race to which we belong and which has the effect of always leaving us unprepared when a great emergency occurs, prevailed in this case.

Let us hope that the severe lesson we have received will not be allowed to go unheeded, as have so many former ones, and that in South Africa at all events we shall adopt such precautions as will make needless the terrible expenditure of life and the enormous waste of money which this war now happily at an end – has occasioned.

At this time the organization of the Cape Town town guards has gone on so well that we were able to have a grand parade of most of the regiments.  Colonel Cooper the Base Commandant, who had worked up the Town guards system to its present position, and to whose hard work, tact and personal popularity the success of the movement was due, commanded the parade, and I was asked to inspect them. It was a terribly hot day.  After inspection I had to address the officers and men, and in order to do so I was mounted on a motor car.  My words were necessarily few; as I have said the day was very hot, but the car was even hotter, and I thought I should have been cooked before I could bring my speech to a conclusion. I had had no experience of motor cars and to my physical discomfort was added the nervous fear that I might by some unguarded movement set the car in motion, the driver having left me in sole possession.

It was now necessary to visit the Eastern Province and to try to induce the farmers and others to join the new forces.  I went up accordingly with my A.D.C. Captain Greenlee, and was joined by Colonel (now Sir Percy) Girouard who had been appointed my C.S.O. for the purpose of assisting me in organising the local forces. I was indeed fortunate in having at my disposal, if only for a short time, the services of perhaps the most brilliant of the younger officers who had come to the front during the late war.  The fact of his being himself a Colonial soldier gave him great advantage in the work we had to do. A French Canadian he had passed direct from the Canadian Military School into the Imperial Force, and had that Colonial frankness of speech and geniality of manner which is always appreciated by Colonists, to whatever part of the Empire they belong. Girouard’s temporary appointment as my Staff Officer did not relieve him of the even more important position of Director of the Imperial railways. He travelled in a special carriage built originally for the President of the late Free State; this was most comfortable and was not the lease of the benefits I experienced in having Girouard’s services.  We went up the eastern line as far as Molteno.  At all the towns and villages on our route we held meetings and addressed the farmers and towns people urging them to make every effort to assist in the defence of the country and in the expulsion of the invading Boers who were causing such suffering and heavy losses to the loyal inhabitants of the Colony.  We found everywhere the most gratifying determination to do the best under discouraging circumstances. It must be remembered that already the majority of the men of fighting age were in the field.  We met with instances of one European being left in charge of three farms, and the seriousness of this state of affairs can only be understood by those who know how necessary European supervision in South African farming is; yet the men left in this position were willing to turn out for the defence of their district. We went on to East London where at my request Girouard gave some very valuable suggestions to the members of the Harbour Board relative to the effective working of the Port and to expediting the goods traffic which, owing to the pressure caused by the immense quantities of military stores in addition to the ordinary traffic, had become congested, the same state of affairs prevailing at all the Ports.  Indeed one of the lessons taught by the war, and one of the most important, is the necessity of improving the harbours we possess and if possible developing new ones, or we shall not be in a position to benefit by the great improvement of trade which we all believe will follow the war.

After leaving East London we returned to King William’s Town and here our party broke up, Girouard going to Fort Peddie and Alice, accompanied by Colonel Warren M.L.A. and Mr Arthur Fuller M.L.A. whilst I went on to Grahamstown. We met again at Port Elizabeth where we made arrangements for the Town Guard, and from there returned to Cape Town. As Inspector General for Colonial Forces my work consisted, in addition to the office work in Cape Town, of visiting various local Corps and seeing that their just grievances were redressed and their efficiency maintained. I made another tour of inspection in the Eastern Province, visiting King William’s Town and Alice, where for a couple of days I was the guest of that model of British Missionaries, Dr Stewart, who has done more than any other man in the direction of introducing civilization in its best form among the natives of the thickly populated Frontier Districts.  From Alice I visited the very pretty and little known village of Seymour; from here I drove over to the village of Balfour where I inspected a Corps of Kat River Hottentots, as they are called, although there are really no Hottentots among them; they are for the most part half-casts.  They make excellent soldiers and knowing their good qualities, I could not but regret that political considerations rendered it impossible to employ them except in the most strictly defensive warfare. It was an unfortunate circumstance that owing to the conviction that it would be unwise to employ any of the coloured races in a war between the two white nationalities of South Africa, we were precluded from using the excellent fighting material which exists among the coloured people of the Cape Colony. The sympathies of those people were entirely with us, and there would have been no difficulty in raising a large number of them who could have been made available for holding lines of communication and similar duties which absorbed a very large proportion of the regular troops who might have been more actively employed.  I had indeed suggested that if allowed to raise two or three regiments of Cape boys, as they are termed, I could have taken over the defence of a large portion of the lines of communication in the Colony. The considerations above alluded to prevented this idea from being carried.

On leaving Seymour I went to Keiskama Hoek and whilst here was attacked for the first time in my life with the wretched complained of influenza. I was unable to lie up, as I had arranged fixed duties for my inspection and although feeling terribly ill had to struggle on. I managed to finish my work, although at King William’s Town where a dinner were given to me by my old friend the mayor, Mr F. Dyer, I had to leave the table in half fainting condition; I finished, however, my work of inspection and returned to head quarters at Cape Town.  I made my last inspection in the districts of Swellendam and Malmesbury. In the former I had the pleasure of being received by that most hospitable and genial Irishman, Colonel Bourke, who commanded the southern districts of the Colony, and who succeeded in making himself most popular in the district under his charge. At Malmesbury the Commandant was Colonel Airey, an officer of the Australian permanent forces, who had also contrived by his able administration of Martial Law to acquire the respect of those placed under his charge.

A great deal might be said as to the way in which Martial Law was administrated at this time throughout the Colony.  Men like Colonel Bourke and Colonel Airey, when left to themselves,administered it on common sense lines, distinguishing between the loyal and disloyal sections of the population.  Unfortunately there were many men in authority both at this time and later on who did not make this distinction, with the result that the people who really were loyal found themselves treated as if they were rebels and were naturally discontented.  The commandeering of both the horses and mules throughout the Western Province caused great losses to the farmers. In the Western district unlike the Eastern where oxen are used, mules are employed for all farm work, and it may be imagined what an effect the commandeering of all these for military purposes had upon the country.  Whilst visiting Malmesbury I went down to the villages of Hopefield and from there to the beautiful old Dutch residence of Mr Melck at Berg River.  Mr Melck, a thoroughly loyal Dutchman, had raised a very efficient troop of men from the neighbourhood, his own family and that of the Kotzes furnishing most of the troop.  The feeling in this district between the loyals and disloyals was very bitter. The loyals although they comprised some of the leading families in the district had found themselves compelled to give up their connection with various local bodies, such as the school board and the local governing body of the Dutch Reformed Church.  I was much struck with the natural resources in this district, where more grain is grown than in any other district in South Africa, and where dairy farming is beginning to be successfully carried on.  The district is being opened up by railways but I expressed my surprise at the time to the gentlemen belonging to the district whom I met, that no effort had been made to develop Saldanha Bay, the finest natural harbour in South Africa; I little thought at the time that in a few months I should be connected with a company formed to do that which I had recommended my friend to take.

Towards the end of the year 1901 I was informed that a Board of officers was to be appointed to report upon the defences of the Colony.  For some time the Commander-in-chief had been urging the Colonial Government that it was their duty to undertake the payment of a part of the war expenditure.  The Colony it must be pointed out, were paying the local troops and a part of the Irregular Forces.  The reply from the Cape Prime Minister was that he declined on behalf of his government to pay for troops over whom he had no control. The Board sat, but as the officers who composed it had been selected without my being consulted and were all juniors to myself I declined to attend it or have anything to do with it. At the request of the Premier I read their report which was almost identical with the one which I had previously furnished to the Government, the only difference being that they made more sanguine estimate than I had done of the probably number of men available and that they recommended the reduction of certain allowances made to the men in lieu of rations etc.  I felt sure that this reduction would be impossible, as was quickly proved.  The allowances were doubtless on too liberal a scale at first, but it is always a difficult thing to cut down payments of that kind, more especially when you have to deal with the independent class of men from which Colonial Volunteers are drawn.

In the beginning of November I received a telegram from Lord Kitchener asking me as a personal favour to resign my appointment as Inspector General of Colonial Forces and desiring me to proceed to Pretoria to see him there.  I had requested that my resignation should date from the 15th November so as to enable me to wear uniform on the journey to and from Pretoria.  On seeing Lord Kitchener however he assured me that he had only asked my to resign the Staff appointment which I held, and that he intended shortly to employ me in another capacity  In the meantime he asked me to formulate a scheme for the more economical administration of Martial Law, which I proceeded to do.  This was approved and was shortly put into practical operation.  I now found that my resignation had been asked for at the instance of the Colonial Government, who wished for a free hand in carrying out their new scheme of defence. The Premier became in fact Commandant-General.  I must say that I felt very sore at the treatment I had received from the Colonial government, the more so as I had actually been offered the post of Commandant-General, which I had accepted, after some negotiations as to the terms, etc.  I find however that I am doing that which I have frequently found fault with in others viz – dwelling upon personal grievances which, interesting and important though they may seem to ourselves, are of curiously little interest to others.

Having waited for a fortnight at Pretoria I asked leave of Lord Kitchener to return to Cape Town and there await his decision as to where I was to be employed.  He consented to this and I returned, hoping that in a short time I should be once more in active service.  I waited however in vain, I was not again employed, nor – great as was my personal disappointment – could I blame the Commander-in-Chief, who had always shewn me the greatest kindness and consideration.

It is the most difficult thing, as anyone who has been connected with the service knows, to give a substantial command to an officer of irregular troops which would place him over professional soldiers.  I had received a K.B.C. and had been, in conjunction with Sir John Dartnell, one of the first colonial officers who had held even temporarily the rank of a General in the British Service, so I have no right, as indeed I do not desire, to complain of my treatment by the Imperial Authorities. My connection with the Imperial Service finally ceased on the 31st March 1902.

In the early part of 1902 Mr C. Rhodes had returned to South Africa and for a time resided at Groote Schuur his well known property at Rondebosch.  It was well known that he was in very indifferent health, and that he had only returned in consequence of a series of forgeries committed by Princess Radziwell, who was afterwards convicted and punished; but it was only known to his intimate friends that the affections of the heart  from which he suffered was of long standing.

In Kimberley during the previous year, I had met him, and dining with him the night before my return to Cape Town, had asked whether it would be possible for him to attend a congress at the South African League, which we were anxious to hold as soon as the state of the country permitted it.  He then told me that his heart was giving him a great deal of trouble and that the future was quite uncertain.  On meeting him on his return from England, I was shocked at the change in his appearance and was so convinced that he himself was under no illusions as to the state of his health.  It was indeed pathetic to watch the almost feverish anxiety with which he set himself to work to formulate the policy that he was convinced could alone save the country he loved so well, from similar dangers and misfortunes to those from which were just emerging.  He called a meeting of those members of the Progressive Party who he knew to be in sympathy with his views and who had a strong belief in his political foresight.  A large number of members attended from all parts of the Colony.  Never in his best days did Mr Rhodes’ great personality appear to such advantage as when he explained to us his ideas on the political situation and the policy with which he wished to meet it.  He pointed out in the first place that the financial affairs of the Colony were in a most unsatisfactory state, in as much as money was being freely spent without the sanction of Parliament, and that a large proportion of this money was being wasted incarrying out an abortive system of defence, abortive because it involved a very one sided bargain, in which Lord Kitchener (one of the shrewdest hands at a bargain the world over) had completely got the better of the Colonial Premier. He also pointed out the absolute necessity of such a change in the system of representation in the Colony as would give the English or perhaps to speak more correctly the loyal population of the Colony their fair share of  political power.  He showed how undesirable it would be to attempt to bring about the changes desired by means of political agitation, at a time when the Colony would require political peace to allow the bitterness of racial feeling to subside and gradually die out.  He then made a proposal that these difficulties should be met by a voluntary surrender of the constitution of the Colony; the suspension of the Constitution to be temporary, but to last as long as was necessary for the attainment of the desired object. After discussion by all present, Mr Rhodes drew up a petition embodying these views, to be presented through the Governor to the Imperial Government; this was signed by all present and soon after by a large majority of the Progressive Party in both houses of Parliament. We were unfortunately (sic) that the Premier, who might have done so much to assist in carrying out a sound policy and in obtaining from the Colony favourable terms in the scheme of federation which must ultimately result, differed entirely from Mr Rhodes and his supporters, taking what seemed to us all then and still seems to me, an essentially narrow and pedantic view of the constitutional question involved; a position which, reasonable enough at ordinary times, was quite out of place in the face of a great National Crisis.

To meet the financial difficulty Mr Rhodes proposed that we should wait in a body upon the Premier and request him to put a stop as far as possible to further war expenditure.  This was done and Mr Rhodes exercised himself far more than was wise in urging his views upon the Premier, need it be said without effect.

Within a few weeks the end came; and England and the Premier lost the greatest Englishman who had ever lived, certainly one of the greatest men who had built up an Empire.  His death alone was wanting to bring home to his countrymen the impossibility of filling the place he had left open.  In this general we are not likely to see his equal. The loss of his personal influence upset for a time all plans, although his friends still hope that his policy will ultimately prevail; indeed they see plainly that unless it does prevail the future of the Cape Colony is a most discouraging problem to contemplate.

Early in May I was informed that I was to be appointed to the command of the Cape Colonial Contingent to be sent home for the King’s Coronation.  All preparations having been made, I sailed from Cape Town in May on the SS Guelph with 150 N.C. officers and men of seventeen Colonial Troops, assisted by three officers Lt Col Cantwell of the C.M.R, Lt Col Inglesby of the Cape Artillery, and Major Serrange of the Cape Police.  We first heard officially at Las Palmas that Peace had been declared, and the news was confirmed by the pilot who took charge of the ship going up the Solent.

I propose to bring these very imperfect notes of an active life to a close here. With peace and the consolidation of South Africa under one flag, a new era has set in.  Let us hope that the future of the Great Confederation which is undoubtedly about to be formed may be as prosperous and happy as I, who long years ago threw in my lot with one portion of it, believe it is capable of becoming if wisely governed. 

Filed under: Brabant EY, British Soldiers (South African), Oral History Anglo Boer War , anglo boer war